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ABSTRACT
Long gone are the days when Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and drones (multirotor
UAVs) were the exclusive domain of the military for surveillance or tactical strike purposes.
For relatively little money mainly due to high-tech progression in microprocessor design,
anyone can now purchase a drone with GNSS-tracking capabilities and can support a live
high-resolution video feed to its flight controller. The global population of drones has sky-
rocketed in recent years as this new technology has been embraced for both its recreational
and commercial applications. However, the more nefarious members of society have also
recognized the potential for using drones to partake in criminal and terrorist activities. In
such cases, the relatively inexpensive drones are often sacrificed to facilitate a quick escape
once the criminal act has been completed. The pioneering field of UAV/drone forensics has
grown out of the challenge law enforcement faces in examining the abandoned hardware for
digital traces that can be used to identify the criminals themselves.
Keywords: Drone Forensics, UAV Forensics, Global Positioning System, Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS), GNSS Forensics.
1. INTRODUCTION
UAVs are much more than a model aircraft
piloted via radio transmissions from a flight
controller. They are part of an entire net-
work or NoT (Network of Things) ecosystem
of sensors (satellite positioning, accelerom-
eters, gyros, compass, barometer, high-
resolution digital camera, onboard diagnos-
tics); controllers (pilot handsets, smart-
phones); data storage (firmware, onboard
memory, apps) and the GNSS satellites
themselves in orbit (Luo, 2016; Marks, 2017)
and falls under the category of smart mobil-
ity within the smart city model (Baig et al.,
2017). Baig et al. (2017) further argues that
with each drone flight, digital traces are left
in the form of onboard log files (flight logs,
connection logs, and system logs) retained
in memory, GNSS data or in photographic
metadata, all of which the forensic analyst
can use to investigate the drone, and thus
its pilot’s activities.
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In September 2017 the opportunity arose
to conduct a research-based forensic investi-
gation of a crash-damaged Cheerson CX-20
Auto-Pathfinder drone. The drone’s owner
is a recreational drone enthusiast. The drone
itself had crashed beyond repair in early Jan
2015, and since then it had lain untouched
in the owner’s home.
Figure 1. Crash-Damaged Cheerson CX-
20 Auto-Pathfinder as Received from its
Owner.
2. BACKGROUND
The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) can perhaps be traced back as far
as 1849 when Austria used bomb-equipped
balloons to attack Venice (Naughton, 2007).
More recent technological advancements in
the UAV field, not surprisingly, came from
the military’s desire to preserve pilots’ lives
(Wagner, 1982). Through successive mili-
tary conflicts since the 1960s, drones have
played an increasingly important role in re-
connaissance and surveillance operations.
Since the turn of the century, military
UAVs have developed from a passive recon-
naissance role to becoming armed (Strike-
Enabled UAVs) and capable of launching
missiles. In the early 2000s, the MQ-1
Predator drone’s payload capacity restricted
armaments to two AGM-114 laser-guided
Hellfire missiles (Rowley, 2017). Currently,
larger drones such as the MQ-9 Reaper
(‘Predator B’) and Avenger (‘Predator C’)
can carry maximum payloads of 1747 kg
(General Atomics Aeronautical, 2015a) and
2948 kg (General Atomics Aeronautical,
2015b) respectively.
The technological advancements in digital
electronics, GNSS positioning and portable
power supplies in recent years has also
spawned a considerable development of
drones for civil and recreational purposes.
All manner of aerial reconnaissance can be
achieved using UAVs at a considerably re-
duced cost compared to using helicopters or
aircraft, and without putting a pilot’s life at
potential risk.
However, criminal elements have also real-
ized that they can exploit a drone’s capabili-
ties to attain their own goals. Drones are fre-
quently used to fly contraband into prisons
throughout the world (Stitt, 2017). They
have been used to violate another nation’s
airspace (Associated Press, 2013). They
have been used to incite civil unrest (Ames &
Ibrulj, 2014) and to make political protests
(Associated Press, 2015). Terrorists are also
now taking advantage of drone character-
istics too. In 2017, ISIS (Islamic State in
Syria) drones armed with grenade-sized mu-
nitions were observed attacking US-backed
forces in the battle for Raqqa (France24.com,
2017). Imagine the devastation that could
be caused by a drone dispersing Sarin gas
upwind from Times Square in New York
at midnight on New Year’s Eve. Most re-
cently extensive flight disruption was caused
at Gatwick Airport when a drone entered
the restricted air space around the airport
(bbc.com, 2018). Whether the motivation
behind this latest incident was a mere prank
or with future terrorist potential in mind,
the ensuing investigation and the difficulties
in finding the culprits highlights the need to
further research in this new field of drone
forensics and develop worldwide standards
accordingly.
The fact that commercial and recreational
drones are relatively cheap is an advantage
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for the forensic investigator. Compared to
the objective a criminal element intends to
accomplish, the cost of the drone is her/his
lowest priority. As such, the drones em-
ployed for such purposes are most likely to be
abandoned immediately after the intended
action has been taken. Drone forensic anal-
ysis, therefore, is likely to become an ever
more prominent tool in law enforcement’s ar-
senal to try to bring such criminals to justice.
3. METHOD
The forensic analysis undertaken during
this project followed the OSCAR principle
(Davidoff & Ham, 2012), which consists of
the following five steps:
1. Obtain Information
2. Strategy
3. Collection of Evidence
4. Analysis
5. Reporting
3.1 Obtain Information
The first step of the investigation was to
extract as much information relating to
the Cheerson CX-20 Auto Pathfinder Drone
from the Internet as possible. Documen-
tation found included technical specifica-
tions (IMG Electronics Co. Ltd., n.d.),
owner/user operation manuals (Cheerson,
2015; Naudin, 2014), and wiring diagrams
(www.cita.asia, n.d.).
3.2 Strategy
The following step-by-step plan was envi-
sioned for the extraction of any residual data
from the damaged drone1, and to determine
1The condition of the drone can be seen in Figure
1. The upper cowling, including the GPS antenna
mounting, were entirely missing, as where the pro-
how accurately the drone positioned itself
according to received GNSS signals. How-
ever, the success of this investigation would
ultimately depend on the degree of damage
that had been sustained at the electrical and
mechanical component level:
3.2.1 Extraction of Residual Flight
Data
• Inspect the internal components of the
crash-damaged CX-20 to confirm the
hardware specifications published by
the manufacturer and determine if any
wiring needed to be replaced or inserted.
• Establish if the CX-20 powers up using
a compatible power supply.
• Remove the ArduPilotMega (APM)
CPU circuit board.
• Confirm if serial communications can
be established between the APM CPU
board and a computer via a micro USB
cable.
• Install manufacturer-recommended
Mission Planner software. As this is
Windows-only software, it was installed
on a desktop PC running Windows-10.
• Connect the APM CPU board on the
Mission Planner software.
• Extract any available log files represent-
ing residual flight data before the CX-
20’s crash.
• Analyze the residual flight data.
pellers. The lower cowling was cracked in several
places. Electronic components appeared physically
intact, but with several wires disconnected.
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3.2.2 Generation of Simulated Flight
Data
Figure 2 shows the configuration of the hard-
ware setup housed in a Faraday cage2 to be
used to conduct GNSS simulation tests.
Figure 2. GNSS Simulation Configuration
within a Faraday Cage.
Hannay (2017) uses the terms ‘open sky’,
referring to the outdoor real-world surround-
ings, as opposed to the ‘closed sky’ environ-
ment within the confines of a Faraday cage.
The latter improves repeatability by remov-
ing the random effects of “atmospheric con-
ditions, unpredictable multipath effects, and
infrastructure change during the research pe-
riod”.
Preparations were made to conduct the
following experiments:
1. Compare the signals received from a
simulated flight path as recorded by
monitor software and the drone control
software (Test A).
2. Compare the signals received from a
residual flight path recovered from the
2The purpose of a Faraday cage is to block ex-
ternal electromagnetic fields, which may interference
with the lab-test signals and skew results. The Fara-
day cage used in this case is a specially-built secure
enclosure within the Security Research Institute at
Edith Cowan University, Joondalup, Western Aus-
tralia.
drone as recorded by monitor software
to the data existing in the drone control
software (Test B).
The purpose of these experiments is to test
the efficacy of forensic procedures when ap-
plied to data acquired from crashed drones.
This can only be possible through a rigor-
ous assessment of captured drone data from
the wreckage and through matching of the
acquired data with flight path data acquired
from simulated drones in a controlled lab en-
vironment.
Test A:
1. Make up a flight path using Mission
Planner software and save this as a
.kml3 or an NMEA-compatible4 file for-
mat to SatGen Trajectory Generator
software5.
2. Simulate GNSS signal traffic, using an
appropriate GNSS almanac, via a Lab-
Sat2 GNSS Simulator6 and a GNSS sig-
nal amplifier.
3. Simultaneously record the transmitted
GNSS signals on GPSMon Software7 via
3The Keyhole Markup Language (kml) for-
mat is used to create an XML-based file for
geographic annotation and visualization pur-
poses on two-dimensional maps and three-
dimensional planet browsers (such as Google
earth). developers.google.com (2018) lists the
parameters that can be contained within a .kml file.
4National Marine Electronics Association
(NMEA) file format is used for communication
between many types of marine electronic devices,
including GPS receivers
5SatGen software (LabSat, 2018b) enables the
creation of a GNSS signal-data user-generated tra-
jectory file. This can then be replayed on a LabSat
GNSS Simulator.
6LabSat2 (LabSat, 2018a) simulates the naviga-
tion signals associated with various GPS systems.
7GPSMon (Raymond, n.d.) provides real-time
GPS packet monitoring and control.
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a BU-353S4 USB GNSS Receiver8 and
on the Cheerson CX-20 drone via Mis-
sion Planner software.
4. Compare the recorded GPSMon con-
trol flight path data with the recorded
Cheerson CX-20 drone/Mission Planner
flight-path data.
Test B:
1. Take a flight data record from the drone
(crash flight from 4 Jan 2015 selected),
convert it to a .kml or an NMEA-
compatible file format, and input it to
the SatGen Trajectory Generator soft-
ware.
2. Generate the GNSS signal traffic, using
a GNSS almanac from 4 Jan 2015, for
the flight data record selected via a Lab-
Sat2 GNSS Simulator and a GNSS sig-
nal amplifier.
3. Record the transmitted GNSS signals
on GPSMon Software via a BU-353S4
USB GNSS Receiver.
4. Compare the recorded GPSMon control
flight path data with the selected Cheer-
son CX-20 drone flight path data.
3.3 Collection of Evidence
3.3.1 Extraction of Residual Flight
Data
1. Inspection of the internal components
of the CX-20 showed that it consisted of
the hardware as published by the drones
manufacturer.
2. The drone’s owner had removed the
11.1V 2700 mAh power supply that
8The BU-353S4 (oziexplorer3.com, n.d.) is a
small magnet-mounted GPS receiver suitable for
lab-test environments.
came with the unit and cut the power
cables off at the terminals on the moth-
erboard. Replacement wires were sol-
dered in place, and an MG Power 35C
11.1V 5300 mAh power supply was at-
tached. Restoration of power was suc-
cessful in that lights within the large
white APM box in the center of the
drone flashed and one of the rotor mo-
tors attempted to turn.
3. The APM box was opened, and the
APM v2.52 CPU circuit board on top
was separated from the APM I/O cir-
cuit board below.
Figure 3. Top View of the APM v2.52 CPU
Circuit Board.
Figure 4. Bottom View of the APM v2.52
CPU Circuit Board.
4. The APM CPU board was connected
to a laptop computer. After installa-
tion of the appropriate Arduino Mega
2560 driver, serial communications were
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established, indicated by flashing green
receive/transmit lights on the circuit
board.
Figure 5. Serial Communication with APM
v2.52 CPU Circuit Board Established via
Micro USB Cable.
5. To interact with the sensors on the
APM CPU board and access any
residual flight data in memory, the
manufacturer-recommended flight man-
agement software Mission Planner was
installed on the laptop computer (ver-
sion 1.3.49 build 1.1.6410.20232).
6. Mission Planner detected the APM
CPU board on serial port COM3, to
which it successfully connected.
Figure 6. Mission Planner GUI with APM
v2.52 CPU Circuit Board Connected on
COM3.
7. The ‘DataFlash Logs’ tab was selected
on the Mission Planner GUI, and the
‘Download DataFlash Log Via Mavlin’
button was clicked. The Mission Plan-
ner Log Downloader module extracted
all available files on the APM circuit
board onto the laptop computer.
Figure 7. Mission Planner Log Downloader
in Progress.
8. A forensic copy of the downloaded log
file directory was made, which would be
used as a working copy for analysis of
the downloaded files. The integrity of
the forensic copy was verified by com-
paring hash values between the copy
and the original file.
3.3.2 Simulation of Flight Data
Test A:
Four waypoints were selected on Mission
Planner software within the ECU Joondalup
campus, which constituted an irregular-
quadrilateral flight path to be simulated.
Figure 8. Mission Planner Log Downloader
in Progress.
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1. A .kml file for the chosen flight path
was uploaded to the SatGen Trajectory
Generator software.
2. Mission Planner software configuration
was modified to disable all pre-flight
tests, disable all advanced parameters,
and arm the drone for the impending
simulated flight.
3. SatGen Trajectory Generator software
initially converted the .kml data into
an NMEA-compatible file format, and
then into a .dsf format for injection
into the LabSat2 GNSS Simulator. The
generated GNSS signals, using an up-
to-date almanac, were amplified via
an HD Communications Core HD26001
GNSS Amplifier before being transmit-
ted within the confines of the Faraday
cage.
4. GPSMon software via a BU-353S4 USB
GNSS Receiver and the Cheerson CX-
20 drone GNSS sensor connected to
the Mission Planner software recorded
the transmitted GNSS signals simulta-
neously.
5. A comparison was made between the
recorded GPSMon control flight path
data with the recorded Cheerson CX-20
drone flight path data.
Test B:
1. Flight data recovered from the drone
(crash flight on 4 Jan 2015) was ex-
tracted, converted to a .kml file, and up-
loaded to the SatGen Trajectory Gener-
ator software.
2. SatGen Trajectory Generator software
converted the .kml data into an NMEA-
compatible file format, and then into a
.dsf format for injection into the Lab-
Sat2 GNSS Simulator. The generated
GNSS signals, using an up-to-date al-
manac, were amplified via an HD Com-
munications Core HD26001 GNSS Am-
plifier before being transmitted within
the confines of the Faraday cage.
3. GPSMon software via a BU-353S4 USB
GNSS Receiver recorded the transmit-
ted GNSS signals from the simulated
crash flight.
4. A comparison was made between the
recorded GPSMon control flight path
data with the download crash flight
data from the Cheerson CX-20 drone.
3.4 Analysis
The \logs\QUADROTOR\1 directory con-
tained 75 files. Of these several small
files had timestamp dates which significantly
predated the viable date of manufacture,
and these are interpreted to have existed
from the time this CX-20 left the assem-
bly plant. More realistic timestamp dates
were associated with larger files, which could
be used to differentiate between separate
flights. Six files with extensions .bin, .kmz,
.log, .log.gpx, .log.param, and .log0wp.txt
were associated with each of seven separate
datasets on 25 Dec 2014, 26 Dec 2014, 28
Dec 2014, 29 Dec 2014, 3 Jan 2015 and two
on 4 Jan 2015. Each of these datasets corre-
sponds to an individual drone flight.
The seven .kmz files were imported into
Google Earth Pro version 7.1.5.1557. Of par-
ticular interest is the second flight on 4 Jan
2015, which shows the CX-20s final sortie
and its near-vertical fall to the moment of
impact.
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Figure 9. CX-20’s Final Flight at Ocean
Reef Marina, WA. Impact at≈09:43:52 UTC
on 4 Jan 2015.
In Figure 9, the differently colored vertical
lines represent different APM modes for the
drone:
1. Orange - ‘Stabilize’ (Manual flight mode
Responding to pilot commands)
2. Yellow - ‘Loiter’ (Stable/hold position
no input)
3. Green - ‘RTL’ (Return to Launch mode
Track to be taken to return to the orig-
inal take-off position)
Also of interest is the ‘flight’ recorded on
28 Dec 2014. 65 seconds of data exist and
are located in the center of the owner’s house
(out of respect for the owner’s anonymity,
this will not be shown). However, if this had
been a criminal investigation, the fact that
residual drone data was able to locate a spe-
cific address is extremely significant.
3.4.1 Crash Investigation deduced
from Residual Flight Data
While this paper is primarily concerned with
the potential usefulness of forensic analy-
ses of drones to bring criminals to justice,
the chance of having a crash-damaged drone
to analyze spawned the opportunity of con-
ducting an ‘air-crash investigation’ in an at-
tempt to determine the cause of the drone’s
demise. The following two steps were out-
lined to accomplish this:
1. Analyze all pertinent parameters asso-
ciated with the drone’s final flight, from
take-off to impact.
2. If possible, ascertain the cause of the
crash.
Mission Planner software is capable of per-
forming detailed analyses of log files down-
loaded from the CX-20 post-flight. Such
an analysis was performed to determine the
cause of the drone crash on 4 Jan 2015.
An online search was made to find histor-
ical weather data for that date in the Ocean
Reef area. However, most historical data
only covered the past 14 months. Being late
afternoon local time and during summer, it
is reasonable to assume that a moderate to
fresh south-westerly sea breeze was blowing
at the time the flight was made.
The .kmz file shown above in Figure 8
already shows the moment that the drone
crashed. From take-off, it had gained alti-
tude while flying over the water at Ocean
Reef Marina (orange lines), until the mo-
ment it a technical fault caused it to enter
Loiter mode. The yellow line represents the
drones fall to impact at the south-western
corner of the car park, close to the start
of the southernmost boat ramp. The green
lines represent the path and altitude that the
drone would have taken, without pilot input,
to return to the launch position, had it not
been for the technical fault.
From the ‘DataFlash Logs’ tab on the
main user interface, the ‘Review a Log’ but-
ton was clicked. The logs\QUADROTOR\1\
2015-01-0409-42-17.bin file was selected.
A series of graphs were produced to assess
different attributes during the flight.
Since the .kmz file had indicated that the
drone had entered ‘loiter’ mode unexpect-
edly, the ‘copter loiter’ plot was generated
on the Mission Planner Log Browser. dVelX,
dVelY, VelX and VelY parameters under the
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NTUN (navigation information) folder were
displayed.
Figure 10. ‘Copter Loiter’ Parameters Plot.
This plot shows that both lateral and in-
line motion reduced to zero at 09:43:01 UTC.
The assumption is that this is the moment
the drone ceased responding to input com-
mands and impacted the car park within a
couple of seconds later. The plot also shows
that both lateral and inline motion began a
trend towards zero at 09:42:56 UTC. Hence
the technical fault must have commenced
within seconds before this time.
Now that the possible time range when
the technical fault and crash could have oc-
curred was known, other parameters were in-
vestigated to assess the cause of the crash.
Firstly, power failure was able to be ruled out
as a cause of the drone crash. Despite bat-
tery voltage and battery current not being
logged, board voltage was available, which
showed that power had been maintained to
the main board throughout the flight.
Figure 11. Board Voltage in mV.
Throttle plots provided more information
than the battery voltage. ‘Throttle In’ data
flat-lined (at ≈37.7% of full power) at ap-
proximately 09:42:44 UTC on 4 Jan 2015.
Figure 12. Throttle In (red) vs Angular
Boost (green) vs Throttle Out (blue) on a
0-1000 scale.
The three attitude attributes of roll, pitch
and yaw were plotted to see whether the is-
sue with the throttle affected the drone’s sta-
bility. The plot of pitch angle shows a sig-
nificant spike coincident with the time the
‘Throttle In’ attribute flat-lines at 09:42:44
UTC on 4 Jan 2015.
Figure 13. Roll (red) vs Desired Roll (green)
in centidegrees
Figure 14. Pitch (red) vs Desired Pitch
(green) in centidegrees
Figure 15. Yaw (red) vs Desired Yaw (green)
in centidegrees
The fact that these graphs show spuri-
ous data being logged after the moment of
impact in borne out by the altitude plots.
GNSS altitude vs barometric altitude show
height of 41 m and 49 m respectively at
09:43:01 UTC. However, both altitude sen-
sors do not record the rapid fall of the drone
to impact with the car park. The suggestion
is that the technical fault had resulted in the
loss of parameters being logged accurately at
all.
Figure 16. GNSS Altitude (red) vs Baromet-
ric Altitude (green) in meters
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The physics of accelerated motion tells us
that
s = ut + 1
2
at2 (1)
where:
• s = distance traveled (m)
• u = velocity at time zero (ms-1)
• a = acceleration due to gravity (ms-2)
• t = time of travel (s)
If we assume the fall occurred in a vacuum
from a median height (s) of 45 m between
the two sensor values we have and assume
that at the beginning of the fall there was
no vertical motion (i.e. u = 0 ms-1), then:
t =
√
((45 ∗ 2)/9.81) = 3.03s (2)
To account for some effect from air resis-
tance, let’s say that it took four seconds for
the drone to fall from a height of 45 m to its
impact on the car park.
To calculate impact velocity, we can use
the equation:
v2 − u2 = 2as (3)
where:
• s = distance traveled (m)
• u = velocity at time zero (ms-1)
• a = acceleration due to gravity (ms-2)
• v = velocity at impact (ms-1)
For the same assumptions made above,
then:
v =
√
(2 ∗ 9.81 ∗ 45) = 29.7ms-1 (4)
If we again allow for some effect from air
resistance, we can estimate that the impact
velocity would have been at approximately
25 ms-1.
From this evidence, the timeline of events
presented in Table 1 can be drawn up for the
air-crash incident.
Table 1. Timeline of Crash-Related Events
Date Time
(UTC)
Event
4-Jan-15 09:42:17 Start of data logging.
4-Jan-15 09:42:18 Throttle increased for
take-off (from ‘Throt-
tle In’ & ‘Throttle Out’
plots).
4-Jan-15 09:42:19 Take-off (from altitude
and accelerometer
plots).
4-Jan-15 09:42:44 ‘Throttle In’ flat-lines
at 37.7% power. Spike
in pitch angle. Drone
stops gaining altitude.
‘Throttle Out’ becomes
more erratic.
4-Jan-15 09:42:56 Drone commenced los-
ing lateral and forward
motion. Pitch angle be-
comes erratic.
4-Jan-15 09:43:01 Pitch angle still erratic.
Ground speed reduced
to zero.
4-Jan-15 09:43:05 Assumed moment of im-
pact (no sensors log-
ging) at 31.7620◦ S,
115.7281◦ E.
The loss of accurate parameter logging
just before the crash, and certain flight pa-
rameters not being enabled in the pre-flight
setup has somewhat restricted what could be
determined from this investigation. The eye-
witness account by the drone’s owner states
that he noticed the drone suffered from a
lack of response to control commands a few
Page 14 c© 2018 ADFSL
Forensic Analysis of a Crash-Damaged ... JDFSL V13N4
seconds before one rotor stopped. The re-
sultant instability caused the drone to flip
over and impact top-down onto the car park.
Servo logging was not enabled, and so the
failure of a rotor during the flight could not
be determined from the logged data. How-
ever, during pre-flight checks before one of
the simulations conducted in the Faraday
cage, it was noticed that one of the rotor ser-
vos would not spin. Additionally, the spike
in pitch angle at 09:42:44 UTC may have
been a precursor in attitude instability that
eventually led to the drone flipping over a
couple of seconds later.
3.4.2 Analysis of GNSS Simulation
Results
Figure 17. Control vs Mission Planner
vs Drone Lat/Long Comparison for Crash
Flight Simulations
During Test A, Test B1 and Test B2, the
satellite quality control parameters of Hori-
zontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP), Posi-
tion Dilution of Precision (PDOP), Vertical
Dilution of Precision (VDOP), and the num-
ber of satellites in view above the elevation
mask were within acceptable limits.
3.5 Reporting
The final stage in the OSCAR principle con-
sisted of the completion of this research pa-
per. A running sheet of the forensic process
followed is shown in Table 2.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Forensic investigation of UAVs/drones, a key
component of smart cities, is a challenging
task mainly due to the lack of standard-
ization and weak published research work.
Through this research we have demonstrated
that the acquisition of drone data, particu-
larly that of a crashed UAV/drone, is possi-
ble in a forensically sound manner. The data
extracted, predominantly the GNSS data
that provided us with launch-point evidence,
was subsequently used to validate simulation
results obtained through a controlled envi-
ronment for drone simulation, i.e. under-
taken within a Faraday cage. This proved
that the method adopted is accurate, sound,
and can easily be adopted to other types of
UAVs/drones for data verification. This ap-
proach may also assist law enforcement agen-
cies to bring sufficient evidence to identify
the positional history of the drone during the
suspicious act under investigation by foren-
sic investigating officers.
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Test A (Simulated flight over Edith Cowan University - Control vs Drone):
(a) Control & Drone Lat/Long
(b) Control vs Drone Lat/Long Comparison, and Control/Drone Maps
(c) Control vs Drone Distance Difference & Distance Difference Histogram
Figure 18. Control vs Drone Result for Edith Cowan University Simulation
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Test B1 (Simulated flight from Crash Data - Control vs Mission Planner):
(a) Control vs Mission Planner Lat/Long
(b) Control vs Mission Planner Lat/Long Comparison, and Control/Mission Planner Maps
(c) Control vs Mission Planner Distance Difference & Distance Difference Histogram
Figure 19. Control vs Mission Planner Result for Crash Flight Simulation
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Test B2 (Simulated flight from Crash Data - Drone vs Mission Planner):
(a) Control vs Drone Lat/Long
(b) Control vs Drone Lat/Long Comparison, and Control/Drone Maps
(c) Control vs Drone Distance Difference & Distance Difference Histogram
Figure 20. Control vs Drone Result for Crash Flight Simulation
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Table 2. Forensic Analysis Running Sheet
Date Time Procedure
29-Sep-17 13:00 Inspected internal components of the crash-damaged drone.
29-Sep-17 13:30 Established power using an 11.1V 5300mAh power supply (MG Power
35C).
29-Sep-17 14:00 The APM v2.52 circuit board was removed.
29-Sep-17 14:30 Confirmed serial communications present between the APM board and
laptop computer via a micro USB cable.
29-Sep-17 15:30 Installed Mission Planner software, version 1.3.49 build 1.1.6410.20232.
29-Sep-17 15:45 Connected APM on Mission Planner via serial port COM3.
29-Sep-17 16:00 Commenced downloading all available log files.
29-Sep-17 16:10 Downloading of available log files completed.
29-Sep-17 17:00 Forensic copy of downloaded files taken as a working copy. Original files
stored on a forensically wiped and reformatted Emtec 16Gb USB drive.
30-Sep-17 09:00 Commenced inspecting .kmz files with Google Earth Pro.
30-Sep-17 09:30 Seven .kmz files contain flight data. Crash damage determined to have
occurred at ≈09:32 UTC on 4 Jan 2015. Owner’s residence ‘identified’.
30-Sep-17 09:45 Commenced investigation of the drone crash.
30-Sep-17 11:00 Generating graphs of significant flight parameters.
29-Sep-17 12:30 Crash investigation completed. Commenced write-up.
1-Oct-17 10:00 Five waypoints selected on ECU Joondalup Campus for generation of
simulated flight plans.
1-Oct-17 11:30 Four flight plans generated in text and .kml format.
1-Oct-17 12:00 One flight plan uploaded to the APM CPU board using Mission Planner
software.
2-Oct-17 10:15 Test simulation commenced in Faraday cage at SRI.
2-Oct-17 11:30 Test simulation completed.
2-Oct-17 12:00 No GNSS data recorded on CX-20.
10-Oct-17 13:45 Test simulation commenced in Faraday cage at SRI.
10-Oct-17 14:15 Mission Planner software installed on the Faraday cage PC to assess
drone GNSS detection.
10-Oct-17 15:45 CS-20 determined to be detecting GNSS satellites okay, but not gener-
ating log files. Test simulation completed.
16-Oct-17 10:00 Test simulation commenced in Faraday cage at SRI.
16-Oct-17 10:30 New flight path generated over ECU Joondalup campus and uploaded
to SatGen Trajectory Generator software.
16-Oct-17 12:30 Several drone pre-flight tests and advanced parameters disabled to en-
sure the drone arms itself before any simulated flight.
16-Oct-17 13:00 Mission Planner .rlog and .tlog files saved for the simulated flight con-
current with GPSMon files logged.
16-Oct-17 14:00 Test completed for simulation over ECU Joondalup Campus.
22-Oct-17 13:40 Graphical presentations of ECU Joondalup Campus simulation data
generated.
23-Oct-17 12:20 Crash-flight data from drone converted to .kml file and uploaded to
SatGen Trajectory Generator software.
23-Oct-17 12:30 Crash-flight recreated by simulation and recorded by GPSMon control
software.
23-Oct-17 12:45 Test completed for simulation using crash-flight data.
c© 2018 ADFSL Page 19
JDFSL V13N4 Forensic Analysis of a Crash-Damaged ...
REFERENCES
Ames, N., & Ibrulj, S. (2014). Serbia v
albania abandoned after players and
fans brawl on pitch.
https://www.theguardian.com/
football/2014/oct/14/serbia
-albania-euro-2016-flag-halted.
([Online; accessed 25-May-2018])
Associated Press. (2013). Netanyahu’s
helicopter forced to land as israeli
forces shoot down drone.
https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/apr/25/israeli
-aeroplane-shoots-down-drone.
([Online; accessed 25-May-2018])
Associated Press. (2015). Drone
‘containing radiation’ lands on roof of
japanese pm’s office. https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
apr/22/drone-with-radiation
-sign-lands-on-roof-of-japanese
-prime-ministers-office. ([Online;
accessed 25-May-2018])
Baig, Z. A., Szewczyk, P., Valli, C.,
Rabadia, P., Hannay, P., Chernyshev,
M., . . . others (2017). Future
challenges for smart cities:
Cyber-security and digital forensics.
Digital Investigation, 22 , 3–13.
bbc.com. (2018). Gatwick airport: Drones
ground flights.
https://www.bbc.com/news/
uk-england-sussex-46623754.
([Online; accessed 22-Dec-2018])
Cheerson. (2015). Cx-20 auto-pathfinder
6-axis system user manual.
http://www.christiandve.com/
wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
Cheerson-CX-20-user-manual.pdf.
([Online; accessed 25-May-2018])
Davidoff, S., & Ham, J. (2012). Network
forensics: tracking hackers through
cyberspace (Vol. 2014). Prentice hall
Upper Saddle River.
developers.google.com. (2018). Kml
reference.
https://developers.google.com/
kml/documentation/kmlreference.
([Online; accessed 28-Nov-2018])
France24.com. (2017). Exclusive: Is group’s
armoured drones attack from the skies
in battle for raqqa. http://
www.france24.com/en/20170626
-syria-exclusive-raqqa-drones
-islamic-state-group-battle.
([Online; accessed 25-May-2018])
General Atomics Aeronautical. (2015a).
Predator b: Persistent multi-mission
isr. http://www.ga-asi.com/
Websites/gaasi/images/products/
aircraft systems/pdf/
Predator B021915.pdf. ([Online;
accessed 25-May-2018])
General Atomics Aeronautical. (2015b).
Predator c avenger: Next-generation
multi-mission isr.
http://www.ga-asi.com/Websites/
gaasi/images/products/
aircraft systems/pdf/
Predator C021915.pdf. ([Online;
accessed 25-May-2018])
Hannay, P. (2017). A non-device specific
framework for the development of
forensic locational data analysis
procedure for consumer grade small
and embedded devices.
IMG Electronics Co. Ltd. (n.d.). Item
number: Cx-20. https://
p.globalsources.com/IMAGES/PDT/
SPEC/006/K1134468006.pdf.
([Online; accessed 25-May-2018])
LabSat. (2018a). Labsat / labsat 2 - legacy.
https://www.labsat.co.uk/
index.php/en/products/
labsat-2-gps-simulators. ([Online;
accessed 25-May-2018])
LabSat. (2018b). Satgen gps simulation
software.
https://www.labsat.co.uk/
Page 20 c© 2018 ADFSL
Forensic Analysis of a Crash-Damaged ... JDFSL V13N4
index.php/en/products/
satgen-simulator-software.
([Online; accessed 25-May-2018])
Luo, A. (2016). Drones hijacking:
Multi-dimensional attack vectors and
countermeasures.
https://media.defcon.org/
DEF\%20CON\%2024/DEF\%20CON\
%2024\%20presentations/
DEFCON-24-Aaron-Luo-Drones
-Hijacking-Multi-Dimensional
-Attack-Vectors-And
-Countermeasures-UPDATED.pdf.
Defcon. ([Online; accessed
25-May-2018])
Marks, P. (2017). How cops catch
drone-flying criminals.
http://www.bbc.com/future/
story/20170731-how-cops-catch
-drone-flying-criminals. ([Online;
accessed 25-May-2018])
Naudin, J.-L. (2014). Inside the cheerson
cx 20 auto pathfinder (or called the
quanum nova.
https://github.com/jlnaudin/
x-VTOLdrone/wiki/Inside-the
-Cheerson-CX-20-Auto-pathfinder
-(or-called-the-Quanum-Nova).
([Online; accessed 25-May-2018])
Naughton, R. (2007). Remote piloted aerial
vehicles: An anthology. Centre for
Telecommunications and Information
Engineering, Monash University , 3 .
oziexplorer3.com. (n.d.). Globalsat g-star iv
gps mouse receiver (usb) model
bu-353s4.
http://www.oziexplorer3.com/
eng/usb gps.html. ([Online;
accessed 25-May-2018])
Raymond, E. S. (n.d.). gpsmon. http://
catb.org/gpsd/gpsmon.html.
([Online; accessed 25-May-2018])
Rowley, G. D. (2017). Armed drones and
targeted killing: Policy implications
for their use in deterring violent
extremism. Retrieved from
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/
fulltext/u2/1032652.pdf
Stitt, N. (2017). Drone crackdown targets
operators smuggling contraband into
sa prisons.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017
-08-31/prison-drone-drops-could
-lead-to-jail-time/8859402.
([Online; accessed 25-May-2018])
Wagner, W. (1982). Lightning bugs and
other reconnaissance drones. Armed
Forces Journal International.
www.cita.asia. (n.d.). Cheerson cx 20
wiring diagram.
http://www.cita.asia/cheerson
-cx-20-wiring-diagram.html.
([Online; accessed 25-May-2018])
c© 2018 ADFSL Page 21
JDFSL V13N4 Forensic Analysis of a Crash-Damaged ...
Page 22 c© 2018 ADFSL
